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The Value of Cities of Words. Cavell




Introduction: Cavell, the perfectionist aspect of
philosophy and the future of democracy
1 At  the  center  of  Cavell’s  attempt  to  renew,  and  to  a  certain  extent  redefine,  the
tradition of moral perfectionism lies his conviction that perfectionist attitudes are both
constitutive of one aspect of philosophy, the one (that is) turned toward the knowledge
of  the  self,  and  necessary  for  the  survival  of  democratic  societies.  His  work  on
Hollywood  comedies  and  melodramas  speaks  directly  to  how  intertwined  personal
change  and  democratic  aspirations  are  in  his  view  and  to  the  philosophical  and
pedagogical  value  he  credits  popular  films  with.  I  believe,  with  many  others,  that
contemporary TV series deserve the same serious philosophical attention that films
have received and I also believe, with some others, that Cavell’s ideas about what binds
perfectionist  quests  for  personal  change  and democracy  remain  not  only  valid  but
crucial in our contemporary cultural and political landscape.
2 And yet there are so many reasons to doubt whether philosophy may be of any use for
the moral improvement of humans (ourselves included), let alone contribute to achieve
a little more social justice or help defend the very fabric of democratic societies which
seems more fragile today then even a few years back.  Certainly we no longer have
Plato’s  conviction  that  philosophy  can  discover  the  form  of  the  ideal  city  and
philosophers  are  meant  to  be  its  faithful  guardians  (which  is  a  good  thing  in  my
opinion). True, some remain committed to Marx’s reversal of the task of philosophy
from  that  of  interpreting  the  world  to  the  one  of  transforming  it.  But  Marx’s
revolutionary hopes – for philosophy and for the world – are already an admission that
philosophy can at best be part of a transformation that largely exceeds it, that is to say
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that philosophy alone can do very little. The same holds true, it seems to me, for most
philosophers  who,  contrary  to  Plato  and  Marx,  have  an  explicit  commitment  to
democracy.
3 For those of us who care about the world we live in and its future, it is difficult not to
feel helpless at times both as citizens – which is bad enough – and as people who study
and teach philosophy for a living. While the human sciences in general may not be
deemed particularly important either, and their transformative power in the moral and
political domains is equally doubtful,  they at least have a recognizable purpose and
produce some recognizable knowledge whereas philosophy seems – at times or in a
certain mood -uniquely aimless, not only without any practical use but also with little if
any theoretical value, achieving nothing that fits accepted standards of what counts as
knowledge (unless of course it turns to logic or some version of the cognitive sciences
to claim legitimacy). 
4 Stanley Cavell was, I believe, deeply aware of how vulnerable philosophy is, and in a
sense should be, to old and new accusations of being nothing but idle talk as well as of
the  danger  for  philosophy  to  become  indeed  little  more  than  idle  talk,  its
professionalization  notwithstanding.  These  dangers,  and  this  vulnerability,  do  not
come from the outside – the indifference or hostility of culture at large, the changes in
the structure  of  higher  education and the like  -,  but  more crucially  from the very
nature and practice of philosophy itself. For if philosophy produces knowledge, it is a
kind of knowledge with no stable content nor generalizable methods, with no authority
and uncertain outcomes.  And if  philosophy needs to be learnt and taught,  like any
other  discipline,  exactly  how  and  what  one  learns  or  teaches  remains  largely
unpredictable. And yet, for Cavell, we do need philosophy not in spite but precisely
because of the peculiar kind of knowledge it offers or searches for. Such a need might
not be felt by everyone, and certainly no one feels it all the time but it exists, it is real,
and  is  what  gives  philosophy  its  audience:  inside  and  outside of  academia.  How
convincing Cavell’s idea that there is an audience for philosophy is depends largely, of
course, on his understanding of what philosophical knowledge is about.
 
1. From Cities of Words to two kinds of knowledge
5 Cities of Words is an exemplary text in this regard: it offers one of Cavell’s most explicit
accounts of what connects philosophy - in its disciplinary recognized and recognizable
sense - to perfectionism understood not as a moral doctrine but as a register of the
moral life (which is quite a different matter) and to films. What is at stake in bringing
together instances of philosophy and instances of film from the perspective of moral
education is precisely to examine in concrete cases what kind of knowledge philosophy
is, how and why it matters outside of its academic domain narrowly construed; to show
how and why philosophy is sometime called for in our individual and collective lives. 
6 Certainly this set of problems and connections is not unique to Cities of Words, versions
of (variations) such questions are everywhere to be found in Cavell’s work, they are a
constant preoccupation of his philosophy, but a remark he makes in Cities of Words has
always impressed me because in its  very simplicity captures so much of  what is  at
stake: 
[Well, as Freud says,] there is knowledge and there is knowledge. And there is also
such as thing as a culture’s knowing something together, knowing something at the
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same time the others  know,  knowing that  each knows,  knowing as  first  person
plural (something the word consciousness should suggest), a knowledge that the
culture has of itself. I think of it as knowledge that we have of, let us say, the path
the culture is – we are – making for itself, as if it were unconsciously, something
that philosophy is in a position to articulate and so bring to consciousness in its
way. Philosophers from Plato to Hegel and Emerson and Nietzsche and Heidegger,
and in a sense Wittgenstein, have taken this as an essential mission of, or call upon,
philosophy. (It requires statistics to know how many of our fellow citizen, those
who speak for us and for whom we speak, live in poverty. It requires something else
to articulate what our attitudes to the poor are, and to imagine how this plural
attitude can be voiced with confidence1. 
7 It is uncontroversial (one may hope) that statistics, that is to say a form of positive
knowledge, is necessary to assess the level of poverty at any given time and place; it is
also fairly unproblematic to notice that “something else” is  needed to articulate to
oneself and to one another where we stand, as a society, toward poverty (or climate
change,  immigration,  gender  equality  etc.):  that  is  after  all  what  democracy  is,  or
should be, about. 
8 What is  neither uncontroversial  nor unproblematic,  however,  is  that for Cavell  this
“something else” that is needed is itself a form of knowledge and not just a matter of
opinions, habits of thought, beliefs (religious or otherwise), real or imagined interests,
ideology and the like. In other terms, Cavell wants to frame the difference at stake here
not in terms of the distinction between knowledge and opinion, as we might expect, but
in terms of different forms of knowledge. But what are these two different kinds of
knowledge? Or, why call knowledge the need to articulate for one another where we
stand?
9 The first kind of knowledge, of which statistics is a good example, is relatively easy to
define. It  refers to any form of scientific or disciplinary knowledge, to the study of
specific objects and fields, established with specific methods of research and learned in
specific ways (mathematics, economy, sociology, engineering, history or literature all
fit the bill – the list is not exhaustive of course; even philosophy, in the professionalized
sense of the term, might on occasion fit the bill).  It is the conception of knowledge
traditionally associated with Enlightenment, with the faith in the power of reason to
disperse  the  darkness  not  only  of  ignorance,  but  also  of  prejudice,  foolishness  and
superstition  that  grow  unchallenged  in  its  shadows  and  to  guide  humans  toward
personal and political autonomy. Such a faith in reason remains, I believe, an important
part of our explicit or implicit commitment to democracy. After all, the autonomous
individual,  capable  of  making her own informed decisions Kant  calls  for  in What  is
Enlightenment?, is the ideal democrat we all want our fellow citizens to be or to become
(assuming of course we ourselves are already enlightened enough). Who could possibly
want an ignorant, foolish, prejudiced public opinion wield unchecked power?
10 The second kind of knowledge Cavell talks about and associates with philosophy, or
some versions  of  it,  however  is  more  difficult  to  define.  What  are  we supposed to
understand by “knowing together”? How can we do it? And who are “we” who are
called upon to know together? What vision of philosophy, and of reason, sustains such
demands? In a passage from the Forward to Must We Mean What We Say Cavell reclaims
the Socratic origins and lasting aspiration of philosophy and brings us directly at the
heart of the matter:
When Socrates learned that the Oracle had said no man is wiser than Socrates, he
interpreted this to mean, we are told, that he knew he did not know. And we are
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likely to take this as a bit of faded irony or as a stuffy humility. What I take Socrates
to have seen is that, about the questions which were causing him wonder and hope
and confusion and pain, he knew that he did not know what no man can know, and
that any man could learn what he wanted to learn. No man is in any better position
for knowing it than any other man – unless wanting to know is a special position.
And this discovery about himself is the same as the discovery of philosophy, when it is the
effort to find answers, and permit questions, which nobody knows the way to nor the
answer to any better than yourself. Then what makes it relevant to know, worth
knowing? But relevance and worth may not be the point. The effort is irrelevant
and worthless until it becomes necessary to you to know such things. There is an
audience for philosophy2.
11 Socrates’s discovery is the discovery of a domain of questions and problems he is not
free to ignore because they bring him joy and pain, hope and despair, and these are
problems  and  questions  that  cannot  find  answers  in  any  established  body  of
disciplinary knowledge, but only in the examination of the self and in the dialogue with
those who feel them with same urgency and necessity. Not everyone experiences the
power of such questions or comes under the grip of such problems, and no one feels it
all the time, but when these dialogues take place no voice has more authority than any
other.  It  is,  I  believe,  what  Cavell  calls  “conversation”  which  is  simultaneously  a
description of the practice of philosophy and a necessity for the life of democracy. The
discovery of such a domain of knowledge where all questions are permitted and no one
is in a better position to know than anyone else is the discovery of philosophy itself and
explains the peculiar nature of philosophical knowledge which is both ungrounded (in
any authority) and necessary.
 
2. The two pictures of reason in American philosophy:
Cavell about Dewey and Emerson
12 The importance  of  distinguishing  these  two registers  of  knowledge  for  thinking  in
general,  and for  thinking about  democracy in  particular  appears  clearly  in  Cavell’s
characterization  of  the  differences  between Emerson’s  and  Dewey’s  views  on  these
matters. In his essay significantly entitled What’s the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?
Cavell writes: 
Dewey seeks to address a situation of unintelligence, which I suppose is to say one
that negates whatever predicates of intelligence a philosopher holds dearest, hence
a  situation  that  variously  manifests  superstition,  bigotry,  gullibility,  and
incuriousness. In a similar vein Emerson discerns a scene of what he variously calls
conformity, timidity, and shame, something he describes as secret melancholy. It is
a condition Thoreau will more famously name quiet desperation, which Thoreau
perceives to characterize the lives of the mass of men. The connection between
massive unintelligence and general despair is that both are barriers to the future, to
the new day whose appearance both Emerson and Dewey,  in  their  ways,  would
hasten. But the ways are as different as the accompanying ideas of the future; they
amount to different ideas of thinking, or reason. I once characterized the difference
between  Dewey  and  Emerson  by  saying  that  Dewey  wanted  to  get  the
Enlightenment to happen in America, whereas Emerson was in the later business of
addressing the costs of the way in which it has happened3. 
13 These two pictures of  reason or thinking offer different pictures of  what threatens
democracy: I don’t think we should choose, or that Cavell thought we had to. It seems
to me they both remain valid and their tension productive in emphasizing different
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kinds of challenges that it would be equally dangerous to simply ignore. In other terms,
if  Cavell  gives  so  much  attention  to  Emerson,  it  is  not  because  he  considers  that
“superstition, bigotry, gullibility, and incuriousness” have disappeared from the face of
the earth,  but  rather  because  he  strongly  believes  that  the condition Emerson and
Thoreau describe is more pervasive than ever while the awareness of such a condition
remains concealed or repressed. 
14 This  said,  the  fact  remains  that  these  two  pictures  of  reason  put  a  very  different
emphasis on what kind of knowledge we need to cultivate, what our priorities should
be when it comes to counter what threatens democracy and prevents it from achieving
a  better  future  or  living  up  to  its  promise.  Dewey’s  remedy  for  the  condition  of
“massive unintelligence” he perceives is, as we know, to advance and reform education.
Only by learning, and learning better, we can hope to solve the problems society faces
as well as improve our lives, develop our creativity and enjoy the arts. If the system of
education itself is in need of reform and a new pedagogy is badly called for, what we
need to learn remains for Dewey – traditionally enough - the “arts and sciences”.
15 But if our condition is one of “general despair,” how can it be countered? Scientific and
humanistic  knowledge,  valuable  as  they  undoubtedly  are,  cannot  help  overcome  a
melancholy  that  does  not  find  its  origins  in  ignorance  or  insufficient  capacity  for
critical  thinking  but  instead  in  “conformity,  timidity,  and  shame.”  What  makes  us
despair – quietly - of democracy in this Emersonian and Cavellian picture is less the
magnitude of the problems our society faces and the injustice it tolerates or produces
than  our  incapacity  to  address  them.  Such  incapacity  is  not  due  to  the  lack  of
intelligent solutions, creative thinking or scientific advances -and in this sense has no
justifications, no reasons -, but is due rather to our personal and collective indifference,
inaction, silent resignation, conformity, or withdrawal. We may well feel shame toward
the present state of our society, but shame alone has no redeeming qualities: it is more
likely to bring to despair than to change.
 
3. Democratic promise, perfectionist education and
cinema
16 But if “despair” is indeed a widespread condition that voids democracy of its promise
and of its capacity for change and transformation (and we may of course disagree with
such  a  diagnosis),  one  may  wonder  why  Cavell  insists  so  strongly  on  the  political
importance of perfectionism and moral education in general and on the democratic
value of certain films and aspects of popular culture in particular4. What do we learn,
and what do we learn together, in watching a film or a TV series that can help counter
(political) despair? Things we are increasingly likely to do, it should be also noticed,
alone in front of a computer screen.
17 I gladly admit that the only reasonable answer to such questions when put so bluntly
seems  to  be:  nothing  much.  Certainly  nothing  that  belongs  to  the  first  register  of
knowledge  we  have  discussed.  And  certainly  nothing  that  bears  a  straightforward
relation  to  moral  and  or  political  change.  But  the  fact  is  that  there  are  no
straightforward ways to transform oneself or our society, no methods to guide us on
the path toward change (the enormous amount of literature on “self-improvement”
notwithstanding). As well as there are no singular paths and pre-established visions of
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what change should look like because if  there were such things – reliable methods,
secure paths, unambiguous concepts of justice - it would mean that we already know
what we need to become, what virtues to cultivate, how much injustice is reasonable to
tolerate,  whose voices  deserve to  be  listened to,  what  suffering is,  whose  suffering
counts, and whose pain comes first.  Do animals have a voice in the conversation of
justice? Are those who do not hear their pain simply deaf or “soul-blind”? How does it
come then that one and the same person may endlessly hesitate between compassion
and indifference?
18 For Cavell, and this important, we do not know such things, at least we do not know
them once and for all and with certainty; as we do not know, once and for all and with
certainty, what we truly need or desire. We do not know such things either alone or
together,  and this  is  why philosophy as  conversation  is  at  times  called  for:  not  to
provide  definitive  answers,  but  to  allow  our  uncertainties,  dissatisfactions,
unacknowledged desires to be voiced and taken seriously.
19 It is not by chance that the films Cavell loves are all examples of singular journeys,
encounters, and discoveries. They are instances of the difficult search of the knowledge
of oneself and the acknowledgment of others, of how challenging the acceptance of
existence actually is. What they teach, if or when we are capable to learn, is simply that
existence - of the world, of ourselves, and of others – is at issue in ordinary life as much
as in abstract and obscure philosophy. And that avoidance, common as it is,  always
comes at a price. They also teach that this kind of knowledge may be called for in the
most different situations and may occasion unforeseeable answers. If some films have
value  for  a  perfectionist education,  as  for  Cavell  they  certainly  do,  we  shouldn’t
imagine that such value can be cashed out in any straightforward manner: as well as
moral perfectionism does not offer a list of moral norms, a perfectionist education does
not  produce measurable  results,  what  we learn remains  open and unpredictable.5 I
believe  the  same  holds  true  for  TV  series  or  for  some  TV  series:  those  that  have
perfectionist moments and invite perfectionist conversations. 
20 Some of  the  films  in  Cavell’s  canon,  not  all,  let  us  imagine  happy endings.  I  must
confess  that  to  me  these  are  the  ones  that  matter  more  and  I  would  like  on  this
occasion to express my immense gratitude to Stanley Cavell for, among so many things,
having given me the courage to admit it openly (and to myself in the first place). His
insistence on the private and public value of “pursuits of happiness” (in the book with
the same title and elsewhere), so out of sync with most of our dominant intellectual
debates and so seemingly but falsely close to a pervasive culture of “entertainment,” is
not  simply  a  reminder  that  happiness,  like  all  emotions,  has  a  political  dimension,
which is important enough, but also crucially that happiness is much more difficult to
pursue let alone cultivate than fear, resentment, hate, or disillusionment (despair). And
in a certain sense, I would like to suggest, the difficulty of the pursuit of happiness is
one aspect of the difficulty of democracy which can hardly survive without faith in the
possibility of change in spite of its scene of constant disappointment. 
 
4. From The West Wing to Cavell
21 But even if one accepts Cavell’s ideas about the significance of pursuits of happiness for
the life of democratic societies, the fact remains that the value of films and TV series in
this regard is not obvious to say the least. What relation can there possibly be between
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watching  a  (very  satisfying)  remarriage  comedy and finding  my way back  into  my
marriage, let alone into my society? 
22 In an attempt to answer such legitimate questions I  would like to take an example
outside of Cavell’s canon, namely The West Wing (NBC, 1999-2006) by Aaron Sorkin. It is
clearly an idealized picture of democracy, or more precisely of the democratic exercise
of government. I know as anyone else that this is not how real administrations, not
even the best ones, work. In The West Wing the moral and political disagreements may
be intractable, there never is one answer that is simply right, or the only right one;
sometime  everyone  is  wrong  and  sometime  there  is  no  right  thing  to  do  at  all;
sometime the constraints of reality win over the most committed efforts to change and
the limits of agency and good intentions are painfully shown. Friendships and loves are
tested, sometime beyond repair. And what is achieved, at the end, is very little of what
was hoped for. But in the dialogues the meaning of words in never belittled and the
desire to make oneself  intelligible,  even when it  fails,  is  never negated. Of course I
know that this precisely the most idealized aspect of The West Wing and the reason why
it is such a perfect example of a “city of words6”.
23 And yet I remain convinced that I have learned something watching this show, and
others  may have too,  that  it  is  significant  and should not  be  simply  discounted as
entertainment or, worse, as pernicious ideology even if it is nothing more, and does not
claim to be anything more, than a “city of words.” So the question becomes, what is the
value of mere cities of words? Do they really matter? Why do we care (when we do)?
Cavell, in a discussion of Emerson’s trust in a possible audience for his writings, openly
addresses the question of what value, if any, the imagination of “cities of words” has:
[So my question becomes:] Is there some conceivable political importance for an
invisible group whose size is unknowable and whose composition is undeclarable?
One  way  for  me  to  answer,  or  to  keep  the  question  alive,  is  to  say  that  it  is
important if Socrates’s idea of a “city of words” is important. Which is to claim that
if, as I suppose, this imagined city of perfect justice, in whose public affairs alone
Plato’s Socrates imagines the philosopher can participate, is realized by the text
called Plato’s  Republic,  then  a  democratic  successor  of  it,  as  it  were,  is  the
Emersonian essay. A drastic difference is that imagining the perfected democratic
city does not exempt us from acting in the present scene of imperfection [...]. On
the contrary, this imagining is what enables us to act, that is, to exist in freedom
from a despair of democracy; there is no one other than the likes of us either to act
within the present city or to imagine its difference from itself. It is a freedom that
depends on not letting others tell us – not the closest friend – whether our actions,




24 The value of imagining (my) ideal city of words does not consist in knowing that it is
not the city I live in (no imagination is needed for that); nor in the model if offers of
what the just city should be (projecting justice in the unreachable realm of ideas and
ideals does not necessarily free me from despair), but its value consists rather in my
affirming “this is how I would like it to be.” It is an expression of what John Stuart Mill
calls the rights of desires, an affirmation of the desirability of the world, one I hope to
share with some known, and some unknown, others. 
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25 Of course, one can always legitimately ask what distinguishes the desirability of the
world from sheer escape in fantasy,  narcissism, ideology, or some version of “cruel
optimism8.” Maybe nothing, certainly nothing tangible: there is always the possibility
that the one may turn to be the other (or a debased version of the other). And yet, for
those who experience the truth of skepticism, that is to say that existence cannot be
proved or justified but only accepted, the desirability of the world – ungrounded as it is
– offers some help in countering despair.
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ABSTRACTS
This essay is inspired by Stanley Cavell’s attempt to renew, and to a certain extent redefine, the
tradition  of  moral  perfectionism  lies  his  conviction  that  perfectionist  attitudes  are  both
constitutive of one aspect of philosophy, the one (that is) turned toward the knowledge of the
self, and necessary for the survival of democratic societies. His work on Hollywood comedies and
melodramas speaks directly to how intertwined personal change and democratic aspirations are
in his view and to the philosophical and pedagogical value he credits popular films with. The
claim of the essay is that contemporary TV series deserve the same philosophical attention that
films have received and, subsequently, that Cavell’s ideas about what binds perfectionist quests
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for personal change and democracy are crucial in the present cultural and political landscape.
The West Wing series is taken as an example.
Cet article s'inspire de la tentative de Stanley Cavell de renouveler, et dans une certaine mesure
de  redéfinir,  le  perfectionnisme  moral  ;  pour  Cavell  les  attitudes  perfectionnistes  sont
constitutives d'un aspect de la philosophie, tourné vers la connaissance de soi, et sont nécessaires
à  la  survie  des  sociétés  démocratiques.  Ses  études  sur  les  comédies  et  les  mélodrames
hollywoodiens  témoignent  directement  de  l'inséparabilité  du  changement  individuel  et  des
aspirations démocratiques,  ainsi  que de la  valeur  philosophique et  pédagogique des  films de
Hollywood. La thèse de l’auteure est que les séries télévisées contemporaines méritent la même
attention philosophique que les films et, par conséquent, que la vision par Cavell de la quête
perfectionniste  de  changement  et  de  la  démocratie  est  cruciale  dans  le  paysage  culturel  et
politique aujourd’hui. La série Á la Maison-Blanche (The West Wing) est prise comme exemple.
INDEX
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AUTHOR
PAOLA MARRATI
Paola Marrati is a professor at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore (MD) since 2003 where she
teaches modern and contemporary French philosophy. She was Program Director at the
International College of Philosophy (ICPh) from 2001 to 2007. Prior to teaching in the United
States, Paola Marrati held a chair in philosophy of art and culture at the University of
Amsterdam. Her research interests include contemporary French philosophy, in particular
Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze, American philosophy, in particular the moral and political
issues in Cavell’s philosophy, film studies and gender studies. He is the author of, among others: 
La Genèse et la Trace. Derrida lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger (Kluwer, 1998), Gilles Deleuze, cinéma et
philosophie (PUF, 2003) and Gilles Deleuze. Cinema and Philosophy (Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2008). She edited Understanding Cavell, Understanding Modernism (Bloomsbury Press,
forthcoming in December 2021).
Paola Marrati est depuis 2003 professeure à l'Université Johns Hopkins de Baltimore (Maryland)
où elle enseigne la philosophie française moderne et contemporaine. Elle a été directrice de
programme au Collège international de philosophie (ICPh) de 2001 à 2007. Avant d'enseigner aux
États-Unis, Paola Marrati a occupé une chaire de philosophie de l'art et de la culture à
l'Université d'Amsterdam. Ses recherches portent sur la philosophie française contemporaine, en
particulier Jacques Derrida et Gilles Deleuze, la philosophie américaine, en particulier les
questions morales et politiques dans la philosophie de Cavell, les études cinématographiques et
les études de genre. Elle est notamment l’auteure de : La genèse et la trace. Derrida lecteur de Husserl
et Heidegger (Kluwer, 1998), Gilles Deleuze, cinéma et philosophie (PUF, 2003) et Gilles Deleuze. Cinema
and Philosophy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). Elle a édité Understanding Cavell, 
Understanding Modernism (Bloomsbury Press, à paraître en décembre 2021).
The Value of Cities of Words. Cavell on Perfectionism, Films, and TV Series
TV/Series, 19 | 2021
10
